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INTRODUCTION
The class action, which allows a single, representative plaintiff to
bring a lawsuit on behalf of a large group of similarly situated claim-
ants,' is a popular-albeit controversial 2-procedural device for liti-
gating claims in the U.S. courts.3 Its popularity stems from its ability
to combine multiple claims against the same defendant into one large
lawsuit. This serves a dual purpose: First, it conserves judicial and
party resources by binding absent class members to the final class set-
I See I HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS § 1.01 (3d ed.
1992). While defendant class actions are possible under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, see id. § 4.45, they are rare, and so will not be discussed in this Note.
2 The class action lawsuit has been characterized as "the most controversial of all the
proposed judicial remedies for consumer grievances." Id. § 1.01 n.5 (quoting REDRESS OF
CONSUMER GRIEVANCES: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE 27
(1973)). Consumer advocates and government regulators champion the class action. See,
e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 4 (2000). Many others-corporate representatives among them-argue that
the class action lawsuit is a form of "legalized blackmail," which benefits class action attor-
neys more than claimants and coerces multimillion dollar settlements from defendants
through the threat of costly, large-scale litigation. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
AR-Y, 108TH CONG., THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2003, S. REP. No. 108-123 (2003)
(citing as one of the major reasons for class action reform the fact that many class settle-
ments "enrich class counsel" rather than the injured consumers); see also Arthur R. Miller,
Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92
HARv. I.. Rv. 664, 664 (1979) (discussing the debate for and against the class action de-
vice). A more detailed examination of these anti-class action sentiments is beyond the
scope of this Note.
3 Many legal scholars acknowledge an increase in the use of class action litigation,
particularly in the areas of securities, antitrust, and consumer protection law. See, e.g., HEN-
SLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 ("Class actions . . . seem to be growing in nlmber and
variety."); Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and
Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 401, 402 (2002) (referring to a
"mushrooming of class action practice" in the United States); Press Release, Stanford Law
School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, Thirty-One Percent More Securities Class
Action Suits Filed in 2002 than in 2001 (Mar. 13, 2003) ("Federal securities class action
litigation suits increased by 31 percent between 2001 and 2002, rising from 171 to 224
filings."), available at http://securities.comerstone.com/pdfs/3_03PR.pdf. But see DavidJ.
Bershad et al., A Dissenting Introduction, in SECURITIES CLAss AcrIONs, at 5, 12 (Edward J.
Yodowitz et al. eds., 1994) (noting that "there is simply no evidence to support the asser-
tion that there had been any marked increase in the number of securities suits" and that
"the number of securities class actions filed and pending each year has remained relatively
constant").
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tement or judgment, thereby minimizing the number of separate law-
suits against the same defendant on the same set of facts.4 Second, it
provides a cost-effective method for injured parties to litigate small
claims.5
In some areas of law-particularly securities, antitrust, and con-
sumer protection-corporate wrongdoing often results in relatively
small financial losses to scores of individual investors or consumers.6
Even though the aggregate harm upon society may total millions of
dollars, the small losses suffered by each individual claimant make in-
dependent lawsuits economically impracticable. In such cases, a class
action lawsuit is often the only cost-effective method of litigating
claims. 7 Without the class action device, small-time investors and pur-
chasers would have no recourse in the courts, and corporations engag-
ing in fraud, overcharging, or other abuse of the consumer would
4 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, §§ 1.01 & 1.07. Since Rule 23 permits potential
claimants to "opt out" of class action lawsuits, which preserves their ability to bring inde-
pendent lawsuits on the same set of facts, the class action device cannot provide complete
finality. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the opt-out procedure in greater detail). Few liti-
gants actually opt out of class action lawsuits, however, so most class action lawsuits do
resolve all similarly situated claims. See id.
5 See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("The policy at the very
core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights." (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))); 1
NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 1-18 ("[T]he class action serves to afford indi-
vidual claimants with small claims access to judicial relief that otherwise would be economi-
cally unavailable by means of individual litigation."); STUART T. ROssMN & DANIEL A.
EDELMAN, CONSUMER CLAss AcTiONs: A PRACTICAL LITIGATION GUIDE §1.1.1, at 3 (5th ed.
2002) ("A class action may be the only economically viable way to provide legal representa-
tion for clients with relatively small claims.").
6 See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS AcrioNs IN FOUR
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 13
(1996) (detailing the average recoveries of individual class members in class action lawsuits
from four federal districts); Contact Lens Pricing Litigation: Roberts v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
in CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 2, at 145, 155 (estimating damages to each individ-
ual consumer in consumer class action at $50 to $500, with a class consisting of as many as
three million people).
7 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ("Class actions
also may permit plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individu-
ally. For example, this lawsuits involves claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of
the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.");
Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir, 1985) (noting that "[c] lass actions are a
particularly appropriate and desirable means to resolve claims based on the securities
laws"); Carr v. Trans Union Corp., No. 94-0022, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 567, at *7-8 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 12, 1995) ("Class actions are often the most suitable method for resolving suits to
enforce compliance with consumer protection laws because the awards in an individual
case are usually too small to encourage the lone consumer to file suit."); Deutschman v.
Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 378 (D. Del. 1990) ("The class action device is especially
appropriate in securities fraud cases ... wherein there are many individual plaintiffs who
suffer damages too small to justify a suit against a large corporate defendant."); Bershad et
al., supra note 3, at 6 ("It is widely accepted that class actions are the only practical proce-
dural device for litigating claims of alleged securities violations.").
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keep millions of dollars in ill-gotten gains." By combining multiple
claims against the same defendant, the class action mechanism gives
power to these small claims,9 ensuring that victims have their day in
court and that corporations "disgorge significant profits arising from
unlawful or tortious conduct."'1 In this sense, the class action device
serves as a regulatory mechanism, creating a class of "private attorneys
general" that protect the public interest through private litigation."
When all potential claimants in a class action lawsuit are domestic
(U.S. citizens or residents), the efficiency and deterrent functions of
the class action are harmonious. When foreign claimants are inserted
into the equation, however, this compatibility falters. In order to pro-
tect the deterrent function of the class action device, the court must
allow the maximum number of potential claimants-both domestic
and foreign-into the lawsuit. But even though U.S. courts have the
authority to bind foreign class members to the final class settlement or
judgment-and thereby prevent foreign class members from suing
again, on the same set of facts, in another U.S. court-they cannot
prevent foreign class members from suing again in the courts of their
home countries. 12 Many foreign courts routinely refuse to enforce
U.S. judgments, particularly those arising from class litigation, and no
international judgment-enforcement treaty exists that compels for-
eign courts to recognize or give effect to U.S. judgments.' Thus,
while permitting foreign claimants to join U.S. class action lawsuits
enhances deterrence, it jeopardizes the binding force of the class ac-
tion lawsuit, and therefore its economy, consistency, and finality. This
inability to prevent foreign claimants from suing again in foreign
courts also creates a fundamental unfairness between class claimants
and defendants: Class defendants are forced to defend against a com-
plex, resource-intensive class action without any guarantee of finality.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 does not explicitly mention
foreign claimants. In today's economy, however, companies increas-
ingly merge across borders and sell their products and securities
worldwide. In such a globalized marketplace, acts of corporate mis-
conduct-whether committed in the United States or abroad-injure
8 See, e.g., Bershad et al., supra note 3, at 7 (observing that the class action device "is
the only thing that enfranchises" many small-time investors).
9 See Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part) ("The class action is one of the few legal remedies the class claimant has against those
who command the status quo."); ROSSMAN & EDELMAN, supra note 5, § 1.1.2 (discussing the
multimillion dollar pay-outs brought about by various consumer class actions).
10 1 NEWBERc & CONTE, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-3.
11 The "private attorney general" is an interesting legal fiction that is unique to Amer-
ican jurisprudence. For a discussion of the "private attorney general" idea, see HENSLER ET
AL., supra note 2, at 71-72 and I NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 1-19.
12 See infra Part II.A.
13 See infra Part II.A.
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both U.S. and foreign investors and consumers. Since few other coun-
tries have group or representative litigation devices, 14 foreign victims
often avail themselves of the class action device in order to bring their
claims in U.S. courts. As a result, U.S. federal judges increasingly en-
tertain motions to certify mixed U.S.-foreign claimant classes.
The recent shareholders' action against automobile manufactur-
ing giant DaimlerChrysler is an excellent example. In 1998, Daimler
Benz, a German automobile manufacturer, merged with Chrysler, an
American automobile manufacturer, to form DaimlerChrysler AG, a
German corporation. 15 In the press and Proxy/Prospectus, Daimler
Benz executives billed the transaction as a "merger of equals" rather
than a takeover. 16 Daimler Benz executives promised that after the
merger Daimler Benz and Chrysler would share "equal power, man-
agement and governance" within the new corporation.' 7 This prom-
ise of equal power led Chrysler shareholders to approve the merger.' 8
According to Chrysler shareholders, this "merger of equals" never
took place.1 9 Instead, once the merger was completed, Daimler Benz
executives fired key Chrysler management and reorganized Chrysler
so that it was little more than a division of Daimler Benz.2 0 Chrysler
shareholders from around the world filed suit against Daimler-
Chrysler AG and its officers and affiliates alleging that Daimler Benz's
pre-merger representations and post-merger conduct violated the Se-
curities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.21
Given the large number of Chrysler shareholders, plaintiffs pur-
sued the suit as a class action. When DaimlerChtysler came before the
court for class certification, however, plaintiffs encountered a major
problem: Judge Farnan, the Maryland district court judge assigned to
plaintiffs' motion for class certification, refused to certify a class con-
sisting of both foreign and domestic claimants. 22 Judge Farnan be-
lieved that since foreign claimants could sue again in foreign courts, a
class consisting of foreign claimants was no longer "superior to other
available methods for litigating the claims." 23 Therefore, Judge Far-
14 See Richard 0. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation? The Use and Abuse of Class
Actions in International Dispute Resolution, 37 TORI & INS. L.J. 999, 1019-24 (2002); Thomas
D. Rowe, Jr., Foreward, Debates Over Group Litigation In Comparative Perspective: What Can We
Learn From Each Other?, 11 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 157, 157-58 (2001); Sherman, supra
note 3, at 401.
15 In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 294 (D. Del. 2003).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id,
20 Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 197 F. Supp. 2d 42, 51-53 (D. Del. 2002).
21 Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 197 F. Supp. 2d 86, 89-90 (D. Del. 2002).
22 In re DaimlerChrysler, 216 F.R.D. at 301.
23 Id. at 300-01.
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nan certified a class consisting of only domestic plaintiffs. Judge Far-
nan did not explain what other methods of litigation he believed were
available to the foreign claimants and did not examine the likelihood
that foreign claimants could actually sue again in foreign courts, but
he excluded all foreign claimants nonetheless.
Judge Farnan's decision to certify a class of only domestic claim-
ants benefited no one. On the one hand, DaimlerChrysler now faced
a major, resource-intensive class action lawsuit in federal court. On
the other hand, hundreds of foreign claimants, who were equally
wronged by the conduct of Daimler Benz and its executives, were with-
out a remedy in U.S.-or any other-courts.
As the DaimlerChysler case illustrates, U.S. federal judges are un-
sure how to treat foreign claimants when they seek to join class action
lawsuits. While federal courts have confronted the question of
whether to certify foreign classes for at least three decades, 24 to date
there is little consensus on how to resolve this issue. Federal Rule 23
provides no guidance on the subject of foreign class members, the
U.S. Supreme Court has never granted certiorari to resolve the ques-
tion, and the lower courts have taken a wide range of approaches.
Judges are left to their own discretion to decide whether to permit or
deny foreign claimants access to class action lawsuits. This wide dis-
cretion creates a great deal of inconsistency. Many judges prefer to
avoid the potential enforcement concerns introduced by foreign
claimants by categorically refusing to certify classes including foreign
claimants. 25 Judge Farnan's decision to exclude foreign claimants
24 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1975).
25 See, e.g., id. at 997 (denying Canadian investors access to securities class action); In
re DaimlerChysler, 216 F.R.D. at 291 (excluding foreign investors from securities class ac-
tion); CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 127 F.R.D. 454, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (refusing to certify class consisting of British claimants); see also In reWorldCom, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 305 n.57 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (suggesting, through a discussion of
Ansari v. New York Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), that the inclusion of large num-
bers of foreign claimants is a legitimate ground for denial of class certification because the
foreign claimants' "ability to file suits in their home countries undermines the resjudicata
effect and advantage of proceeding as a class action"); Ansani, 179 F.R.D. at 116 (suggesting
that the existence of foreign claimants "counsels against a finding that the class action is
superior to other forms of litigation" because of res judicata concerns).
Some judges refuse to certify classes containing foreign claimants on the grounds that
the U.S. courts are responsible for protecting only U.S. citizens, not injured foreigners.
See, e.g., Bersch, 519 F.2d at 996 ("United States courts have no reason to become involved,
and compelling reason not to become involved, in the burdens of enforcement and the
delicate problems of foreign relations and international economic policy that extraterrito-
rial application may entail." (quoting Inv. Props. Int'l, Ltd. v. I. 0. S., Ltd., [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 1 93,011, at 90,735 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1971),
afrd without opinion (2d Cir. 1971) (unreported)); see also Faulk, supra note 14, at 1000
("Although 'globalism' may be useful as a commercial clich, its intrusion into jurispru-
dence is disturbing, especially when procedural devices that are not yet recognized interna-
tionally are used to resolve claims arising from conduct that occurs beyond the forum
state's borders.").
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from the DaimlerChyysler securities litigation is a perfect example. 26
Those judges who prioritize deterrence, on the other hand, are per-
mitting foreign claimants access to class action lawsuits despite the in-
creased enforcement and procedural risks that foreign claimants may
introduce. 27
This ad hoc approach to certification is not desirable. As the
number of foreign class members steadily increase, the federal courts
must devise a more coherent set of guidelines for certifying classes
containing foreign claimants. This Note argues that the federal courts
should adopt a default presumption in favor of including foreign
claimants in small claim securities, antitrust, and consumer class ac-
tion lawsuits. Only if defendants can affirmatively prove in their affi-
davits that the foreign claimants have an adequate alternative remedy
either in the U.S. courts or the courts of their home countries-
which, this Note will argue, is not realistic in the majority of cases-
should federal judges exclude foreign claimants from class action
lawsuits.
Part I of this Note provides background on the history and proce-
dure of class action lawsuits in the U.S. federal courts. Part II dis-
cusses the problems created when foreign claimants join federal class
action lawsuits. Part III examines the objectives that compel the use
of class action lawsuits as an alternative to individual litigation, in an
effort to understand why, despite the increased procedural burdens
introduced by foreign claimants, the legal system would still want to
include foreign claimants in class action lawsuits. Part III argues that
deterrence, not efficiency, is the most important objective underlying
the small-claim class action lawsuit and that excluding foreign claim-
ants from classes undermines this deterrence function. Part IV ex-
plains that, in the majority of cases, foreign claimants do not really
jeopardize efficiency or procedural fairness, as the ability to relitigate
the same case in a foreign court, while theoretically possible, is not
practically realistic. In those cases, the courts must grant foreigners
access to federal class action lawsuits, as this is the only way that the
class action can deter corporate misconduct and preserve investor
confidence in the marketplace, two core objectives of the class action.
26 See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRouche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 341 (D.C. Cir.
2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Krangel v. Golden Rule Res., Ltd., 194 F.R.D. 501, 506
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (certifying settlement class consisting of Canadian investors); In re Lloyd's
Am. Trust Fund Litig., No. 96 CIV. 1262, 1998 WL 50211 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1998) (permit-
ting foreign claimants to remain in class despite increased burdens of notice); In re U.S.
Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 50-51 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (permitting foreign debenture holders
to remain in class despite risk that foreign countries might not recognize resjudicata effect
of U.S. judgment).
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I
CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES
The class action lawsuit is a "nontraditional" 2 litigation device
that permits a representative to bring suit on behalf of a larger num-
ber of similarly situated claimants. 29 The representative, whose claims
must be "typical" of the class as a whole,39 acts as a traditional plaintiff
and has a fiduciary duty to guard the interests of the entire class. 3 1
The absent class members have little responsibility while the action is
pending.32 Once the action settles or a trial court renders a final deci-
sion, all class members are bound by the judgment.33 This consolida-
tion is an important element of the class action, providing both the
already overtaxed courts and the corporate defendants the opportu-
nity to resolve multiple identical (or substantially similar) claims in
one complex action. This obviates the need to present the same evi-
dence and experts in multiple suits and gives defendants the finality
of knowing that new claims will not arise in the future, thereby al-
lowing defendants to plan their corporate finances without the threat
of future monetary judgments.
A. The Class Certification Process
Claimants may not bring a class action lawsuit as of right simply
because jurisdiction exists and the number of potential class members
is large. In an effort to minimize abuse of the class action device, the
courts heavily manage class action lawsuits. A judge must certify a
class before the action may proceed to litigation.3 4 Shortly after filing
the complaint, class counsel must file a motion for class certification
("class motion").35 In the class motion, class counsel does not need to
28 The U.S. Supreme Court has described the class action device as a "nontraditional
form of litigation," U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980), in the sense
that the class action is a creation of equity, rather than law. See 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra
note 1, § 1.09, at 1-22 to 1-24.
29 See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(2).
30 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(3).
31 For a discussion of the class representative, see ROssMAN & EDELMAN, supra note 5,
§ 1.2 and FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30 (1995).
32 See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552 (1974) ("[P]otential class
members are mere passive beneficiaries of the action brought in their behalf."); 1 NEw-
BERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-8 to 1-12.
33 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c).
34 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1)(a). For a detailed discussion of the certification process,
see Markham R. Leventhal, Class Actions: Fundamentals of Certification Analysis, FLA. B.J., May
1998, at 10.
35 See RossMAN & EDELMAN, supra note 5, § 9.1.1, at 103 ("The plaintiff should file the
motion requesting the court to certify the case as a class action as early in the litigation as
possible."); WILLCING ET AL., supra note 6, at 8 ("Counsel filed motions to certify... in the
four districts within median times of 3.1 months to 4.3 months after the filing of the
complaint.").
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address the merits of the action, 36 but must establish that "plaintiffs'
allegations, if assumed to be true and to state a valid cause of action,
are suitable for class treatment and resolution." 37
The class motion must prove that the class meets all of the re-
quirements laid out in Rule 23.38 This is a two-step process. First, lead
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the class meets four procedural pre-
requisites: 39 (1) the number of potential claimants must be so large
that joinder is impracticable; 40 (2) there must be common questions
of law or fact shared between all members of the class;41 (3) the claims
of the lead plaintiffs must be "typical" of the class as a whole;4 2 and (4)
the representation of absent class members by lead plaintiffs and class
counsel must be "fair[ ] and adequate[ ]."43
Once plaintiffs establish these four prerequisites, plaintiffs move
to the second prong of the certification test: proving that the class
conforms to one of the categories listed in Rule 23(b) .44 Most class
36 See RossMAN & EDELMAN, supra note 5, § 9.1.3.1, at 104.
37 Id.
38 See id. § 9.1.5, at 106.
39 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). For discussions on the four procedural prerequisites laid out
in Rule 23, see JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R MILLER, CrvIL PROCE-
DURE § 16.2 (2d ed. 1993) and Leventhal, supra note 34, at 12-14.
40 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). When it is possible for all claimants to sue individually,
and therefore to have control over the action and the opportunity to settlejoinder is more
desirable than a class action. See, e.g., CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 127
F.R.D. 454, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Although no particular number define [sic] the point at
which a class action is deemed conclusively inappropriate, a small class militates against
certification." (citation omitted)). Only when joinder is impracticable is a class action law-
suit appropriate. See I NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 3.01, at 3-4.
41 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a) (2). When the claimants have suffered different injuries or
have been injured as a result of separate, unrelated acts, a class action is not appropriate,
even if the claimants were all injured by the same defendant. For this reason, the 1966
Advisory Committee's Note suggests that the class action mechanism may not be appropri-
ate in the mass tort context, since individual claimants suffer different injuries with differ-
ent damages. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) advisory committee's note. Despite this warning,
the class action lawsuit has become a popular device for litigating mass tort cases. In the
securities context, courts have held that the "questions of misrepresentation, materiality
and scienter" that all securities claimants share against the ,defendants are sufficient to
satisfy Rule 23(a) (2). See, e.g., In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 296 (D.
Del. 2003) (quoting Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 372 (D. Del. 1990)).
In antitrust classes, courts have found price discrimination and the impact of the conduct
upon competition to be common questions. See Alfred P. Murrah, Historical Overview and
Perspective on Class Actions, in CLAss ACTIONS 9, 30 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1973).
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
43 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4). Binding absent class members to a final judgment when
lead plaintiffs or class counsel did not adequately represent them in the action would vio-
late due process. See 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 3.21, at 3-125. Before proceeding
to litigation, then, it is important that the court ensure that the "interests of the named
plaintiffs are aligned with the absent members of the class, so as to ensure that the absent
members of the class will be fairly represented in the litigation." In re DaimlerChrysler, 216
F.R.D. at 298.
44 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) reads as follows:
157120051
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
action lawsuits filed in federal district courts seeking monetary dam-
ages are Rule 23(b) (3) actions. 45 Rule 23(b) (3) applies to cases in
which a class action is not absolutely necessary, but would "achieve
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of
decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedu-
ral fairness or bringing about other undesirable results."46 The major-
ity of securities, antitrust, and consumer actions fall into this category.
To warrant Rule 23(b)(3) certification, plaintiffs' counsel must
prove both that the questions common to the class as a whole
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members
and that the class mechanism is superior to other methods for bring-
ing suit.47 In the context of securities, antitrust, and consumer ac-
tions, proving that the "questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate" 4 is generally routine, since the
claims usually arise from a single act or course of action-such as
fraud or price-fixing-that affects all claimants in a similar manner.
Class counsel often has greater difficulty proving that the class
device is superior to other possible methods of suit. "Superiority" is a
balancing test. Judges must weigh a number of factors, including the
interests of individual class members in controlling the litigation, the
extent and nature of any related litigation already pending in other
courts, the desirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular
forum, and the difficulties of managing the particular class. 49 If the
sum of these factors weighs against class treatment, the judge should
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individ-
ual members of the class which would establish incompatible stan-
dards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final in-
junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting individ-
ual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
45 WILLGING ET AL., supra note 6, at 8 (noting that "[t]he most frequently certified
class was the Rule 23(b) (3) or 'opt-out class,' which occurred in roughly 50% to 85% of the
certified classes").
46 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) & advisory committee's note (1966).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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deny certification. 50 It is the responsibility of each individual judge to
weigh the many Rule 23 requirements and decide whether to certify
the class.5 1 While the courts have long advocated liberal certifica-
tion,52 judges who are less enamored of the class action device often
deny certification without much attempt to balance the Rule 23
requirements. 5S
B. Notice and the "Opt-Out" Requirement
1. Adequate Notice
Once ajudge certifies a class, the class representatives must iden-
tify all potential class members and provide them with notice of the
pending action.5 4 Following the Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.55 standard, notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pending action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."5 6 In the
class action context, this means that plaintiffs must send actual, indi-
vidual notice to all reasonably identifiable class members. 57 When
class counsel cannot identify certain class members through reasona-
ble effort, constructive, rather than actual, notice is acceptable.
58
While the exact contours of constructive notice are not outlined in
Rule 23, most courts have held that an advertisement in a widely circu-
lated newspaper or magazine, which notifies readers of the pending
50 See, e.g., CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Coldfeld, 127 F.R.D. 454, 460
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[Tihe combination of these problems, no one of which standing alone
would necessarily require denial of certification, virtually mandates rejection of the class
action form here.").
51 FED. R. Cry. P. 23(c) (1); see also 2 NEWBERG & CONrE, supra note 1, § 7.04, at 7-18
("Trial courts, at least in the federal system, are now taking an increased management role
in class litigation.").
52 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968); Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968).
53 See, e.g., In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291 (D. Del. 2003).
54 See Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (establishing that lead
plaintiffs must absorb the initial costs of providing notice to the entire class). Because
most class action lawsuits operate on a contingent fee basis, class counsel identifies the
class members and absorbs all the costs of mailing or publishing notice. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c) (2)(B); 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 8.01, at 8-3.
55 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
56 Id. at 314.
57 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B) ("For any class certified under Rule 23(b) (3), the court
must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances, includ-
ing individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort."); see
also Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 173 ("Individual notice must be sent to all class mem-
bers whose names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort.").
58 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 30.211 (1985)
(asserting that "[r]eceipt of actual notice by all class members is required neither by Rule
23 nor the Constitution" and that "notice should be mailed to the last known addresses of
those who can be identified and publication used to notify others").
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action and their possible involvement in it, constitutes adequate
notice.59
The certifying judge must determine the proper form of notice to
the class.60 In the order certifying the class, the judge lays out how the
class representatives must provide individualized notice to identifiable
class members, in which newspapers they must publish notice of the
action to reach unidentifiable class members, whether notice in addi-
tional forms of media-such as radio-is also necessary, and the num-
ber of times class counsel must publish the notice. 61
Any form of notice deemed necessary by the certifying judge
must conform to the requirements of Rule 23(c) (2) (B).62 According
to Rule 23(c) (2) (B), notice must inform the class member of the na-
ture of the action, the definition of the class, the claims alleged, and
the class member's right to appear in, or be excluded from, the ac-
tion.6 3 The notice must also state, "in plain, easily understood lan-
guage," 64 the binding effect of the class judgment.
2. Opting Out
If a class member does not affirmatively opt out of the action af-
ter receiving adequate notice, the class member will be bound by the
final judgment.65 The opt-out procedure attempts to create procedu-
ral fairness for both potential class members and the defendants
forced to defend complex class action lawsuits. On the one hand, due
process requires that a potential litigant have some opportunity to opt
out of a lawsuit before being bound by the final settlement or judg-
ment. On the other hand, allowing class members to sue again in
another court whenever the class settlement or judgment is not satis-
factory to the class member would be fundamentally unfair to defend-
ants, who would be forced to defend large, complex class lawsuits
without even the hope of finality in return. The opt-out provision of
Rule 23 strikes a compromise, ensuring that potential claimants have
59 See, e.g., Krangel v. Golden Rule Res., Ltd., 194 F.R.D. 501, 505 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(finding that "summary notice in The Wall StreetJournal and The Globe and Mail was the best
means practicable to notify [unidentifiable] class members"); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69
F.R.D. 24, 47 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (stating that class members would get adequate notification
if notice is published "in secular and financial newspapers and magazines of wide circula-
tion ... in appropriate foreign languages").
60 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2)(B); see2 NEWBERG &CONTE, supranote 1, § 8.02, at8-4 to8-
5 ("The rule was fashioned from the premise that courts must be allowed flexibility in
deciding what constitutes adequate notice .... While the language of the rule itself makes
notice mandatory in a Rule 23(b)(3) damages suit, the nature and extent of how that
mandate is to be carried out are not predetermined in the rule.").
61 See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 983 (2d Cir. 1975).
62 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
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an opportunity to opt out of the class action lawsuit at an early stage,
but also ensuring that all claimants who do not opt out by a certain
date cannot later relitigate the same issues because they are bound to
the final result of the class litigation.
Few potential class members opt out of class action lawsuits.
66
One reason for this may be the lack of a better alternative for litigat-
ing claims. There is little incentive for a claimant to opt out of a class
action lawsuit when the claimant's damages are too small to justify an
independent suit. Another potential explanation is human psychol-
ogy. Research suggests that people are much more likely to consent
to a procedure "when consent is measured passively, by failure to file
an objection, rather than actively, by explicitly registering agreement
to participate. ' 67 This lack of incentive to opt out is increased by the
fact that absent class members have no responsibilities while the ac-
tion is pending, so the burdens of remaining in the lawsuit are rela-
tively low. 68
3. Opting In
Scholars and practitioners disagree on whether Rule 23 requires
that judges use the opt-out procedure. 69 Some scholars argue that
even though Rule 23 privileges the opt-out procedure, it permits
judges to certify classes under an opt-in procedure in special circum-
stances. In In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, the court observed
that "the majority of the judiciary and the legal commentators believe
that Rule 23 only provides for an 'opt-out' procedure and, therefore,
advocate its use solely. ' 7' The court then goes on to assert, however,
that the "history and the language of Rule 23 and recent decisions
thereto permit the establishment of an 'opt-in' class," and to list a
number of post-1966 cases that utilized the opt-in procedure. 7 '
The availability of the opt-in procedure takes on added signifi-
cance when a class contains a large number of foreign class members.
Under an opt-in procedure, the judge would give direct notice to all
class members, informing them that they could not share in the final
judgment "unless they transmit to the Court a specific request for in-
clusion."72 By opting in to the action, class members would be "af-
66 WILLGING ET AL., supra note 6, at 10 ("Across all four districts, the median percent-
age of members who opted out of a settlement was either 0.1% or 0.2% of the total mem-
bership of the class.").
67 HENSLER FT AL., supra note 2, at 38 n.22.
68 See supra note 32.
69 See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 53 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 53-54.
72 CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 127 F.R.D. 454, 459 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
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firmatively agreeing to be bound and voluntarily subjecting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court for such purposes. ' 73 At
least one commentator actively advocates the use of opt-in classes as a
way to avoid the potential problems of jurisdiction and notice that
may arise when foreign claimants attempt to join class action
lawsuits. 7
4
Still, "opt-in" classes have serious drawbacks. First, the opt-in pro-
cedure can be rather inefficient. Under an opt-in procedure, the
courts are forced to monitor the class more closely, since the size and
contours of the class constantly change as potential class members
continue to opt in to the class, and class counsel is forced to process
hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of opt-in forms.
Second, opt-in classes make it difficult for defendants to plan a
litigation strategy, since they do not know until rather late in the pro-
cess how many potential class members will actually opt in to the ac-
tion. This inability to plan deters settlement, which can be highly
desirable in the context of complex class litigation. Thus, if not used
properly, the opt-in procedure can become a serious administrative
nightmare for both the courts and the parties. If this occurs, the
courts would simply be trading one inefficiency-the risk that foreign
class members will not be bound-for another-the opt-in procedure.
Third, opt-in classes may undermine the deterrent function of
the class device. As one Canadian legal scholar recently observed:
Requiring the members of a plaintiff class to opt-in to the class...
necessarily results in a class that is comprised of far fewer members
than it might otherwise contain.
•.. [T]o the extent that class actions are intended to have a
regulatory effect by requiring market actors to internalize the costs
of wrongful conduct, under-inclusive plaintiff classes mean that the
costs internalized are less than the costs generated by the wrongful
conduct. 75
By diminishing the number of potential plaintiffs in the class, the opt-
in device may weaken the ability of class action lawsuits to deter the
corporate wrongdoer's conduct. In this sense, the opt-in class is the
worst of both worlds: It creates added administrative burdens for both
the parties' attorneys and the judge, which undermines the efficiency
function of the class action. At the same time, the opt-in class makes it
easier for corporations to absorb the legal costs of their wrongful be-
havior, which undermines the deterrent function of the class action.
73 Id.
74 See Debra Lyn Bassett, US. Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class Actions and
Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FoptHAm L. REv. 41, 85-89 (2003).
75 Janet Walker, Crossborder Class Actions: A View from Across the Border, 2004 MIcH. ST. L.
REv. 755, 770.
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In short, while the opt-in class may be desirable in special circum-
stances, it is not appropriate as a default state any time foreign claim-
ants are involved in a U.S. class action lawsuit. If, however, if the
judge must choose between denying all foreign claimants access to the
class or certifying foreign claimants under an opt-in class in order to
solve potential jurisdictional concerns, the opt-in class is the more de-
sirable of these options because the opt-in class gives foreign claimants
to opportunity to obtain redress.
II
COMPLICATING COMPLEX LITIGATION: THE PROCEDURAL
DIFFICULTIES INTRODUCED By FOREIGN CIAIMANTS
Upon a motion for class certification, a district judge must bal-
ance the right of the claimants to avail themselves of the class action
mechanism against the administrative burdens that the class action
lawsuit will impose on the defendants and the courts. 76 Foreign class
members add additional burdens to both defendants and courts.
First, while the preclusive effect of a U.S. class judgment in the courts
of another U.S. state is clear, the preclusive effect of the same judg-
ment in the courts of a foreign country is not. Second, though of
lesser concern than the first, sending notice abroad may be challeng-
ing, particularly when not all class members are explicitly identified.
Because adequate notice is a requirement for due process, a foreign
class member who has not received proper notice cannot be bound by
the class settlement or judgment.7 7 So, for two distinct-though
clearly interrelated-reasons, foreign claimants jeopardize the bind-
ing nature of the class device. Many judges consider the res judicata
and notice problems introduced by foreign claimants to be valid rea-
sons for denying class certification to foreign claimants.
A. Res Judicata Effect of U.S. Judgments in Foreign Courts
The biggest problem with permitting foreign claimants to join
class action lawsuits is the dubious status of U.S. judgments in foreign
courts. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution re-
quires all U.S. state courts to recognize and enforce a valid judgment
rendered by the courts of a sister state. 78 This ensures that plaintiffs
cannot sue successively in different forums to achieve the most desira-
ble outcome, wasting judicial and party resources relitigating on the
same set of facts. Unfortunately, there is no treaty equivalent of the
76 This is the purpose of the "superiority" inquiry incorporated into Rule 23. See FED.
R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3).
77 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (set-
ting the generally recognized due process standard for notice in U.S. courts).
78 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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Full Faith and Credit Clause that guarantees the recognition and en-
forcement of U.S. judgments in foreign countries. 79 While U.S. courts
routinely enforce the judgments of foreign nations as a matter of com-
ity,"" few foreign courts automatically recognize or enforce U.S. judg-
ments."' Instead, most foreign courts are skeptical of U.S.judgments,
reviewing them carefully and frequently denying enforcement of
these judgments on "public policy" grounds.82 Therefore, while a
class judgment may preclude absent class members from suing again
in another U.S. court, the same judgment likely would not preclude
absent foreign class members from suing again in the courts of their
home countries.8 3
The United States has attempted to negotiate judgment-recogni-
tion treaties on numerous occasions.8 4 These attempts have failed for
a number of reasons. First, the large punitive and treble damage
awards granted in U.S. courts offend foreign notions of public pol-
icy.8 5 Most civil-law countries believe that it is the role of the govern-
ment, not private litigants, to regulate conduct, and that private
lawsuits exist primarily to compensate victims for their losses. The
United States subscribes to a different philosophy, believing instead
that the threat of large civil damages in suits by private litigants is an
effective way to deter illegal conduct.86 True to this philosophy, U.S.
79 See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Con-
vention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BRoOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 167-68
(1998).
80 In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), the U.S. Supreme Court held that "comity
of nations" requires U.S. courts to recognize and enforce foreign judgments. This case is
still good law, setting a generous recognition standard in the United States. Section 481 (1)
of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which reflects the existing standard
for the recognition of foreign judgments in U.S. courts, states: "[A] final judgment of a
court of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, establishing or
confirming the status of a person, or determining interests in property, is conclusive be-
tween the parties, and is entitled to recognition in courts in the United States." RESTATE-
MENt (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 481 (1) (1987). For a thorough discussion on
the status of foreign judgments in U.S. courts, see Weintraub, supra note 79, at 173-78.
81 SeeWeintraub, supranote 79, at 179-84; see also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974, 997 (2d Cir. 1975) ("European courts are far less inclined to recognize foreign
judgments than are American courts .... ).
82 See Weintraub, supra note 79, at 179-84.
83 See id. However, Weintraub notes that "recognition of foreign money judgments is
common and recent changes have accelerated the trend towards recognition." Id. at
178-79.
84 See id. at 168-69 (discussing some of the failed attempts at negotiating ajudgments
convention); John C.L. Dixon, The Res Judicata Effect in England of a US Class Action Settle-
ment, 46 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 134, 138 (1997) (noting numerous attempts to establish a
reciprocal judgment enforcement treaty between the United States and the United
Kingdom).
85 See Weintraub, supra note 79, at 182-83 (discussing other countries' dislike of puni-
tive and multiple damages).
86 See, e.g., Mark A. Klugheit, "Where the Rubber Meets the Road": Theoretical Justifications
vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive Damages Litigation, 52 SvRCUSE L. REv. 803, 805 (2002)
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courts permit plaintiffs to sue for damages in excess of the their actual
losses in many types of suits.8 7 Because courts in most other countries
do not agree with the use of private litigation to punish and deter
rather than to compensate, they permit private plaintiffs to recover
only actual, compensatory damages and will not enforce a U.S. judg-
ment that permits punitive damages.88 Second, U.S. courts assert, or
refuse to assert, jurisdiction over parties on different grounds than
most civil-law courts.8 9 If a U.S. court exercises jurisdiction over a
party based on a form ofjurisdiction foreign to the law of the enforc-
ing country, the foreign court often will refuse to enforce the judg-
ment.90 Finally, courts are often wary about enforcing foreign
judgments based upon public law subjects, such as securities or anti-
trust. When the public law of the judgment-issuing country differs
from the public law of the judgment-enforcing country,9 1 enforcing a
judgment based upon U.S. public law interferes with the sovereign
right of the enforcing country to decide what conduct to regulate
within its own borders.92
All of these concerns have impeded efforts to enact a foreign
judgment-recognition treaty between the United States and other
countries. These concerns are only magnified in the context of class
action lawsuits, in which the aggregate damage awards are large, the
bases for exercising jurisdiction over absent class members are often
tenuous, and the subject matter of the suit often touches upon areas
of public law.
In addition, most foreign countries disapprove of the U.S. class
action device,9 3 which amplifies the risk that foreign courts will deny
(discussing the use of punitive damages to further social goals, particularly deterrence of
similar conduct in the future).
87 For example, plaintiffs bringing tort or consumer protection actions under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act may sue for punitive damages, see Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1968,
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000), and plaintiffs bringing federal antitrust actions are entitled to
treble damages, see Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
88 See Weintraub, supra note 79, at 182-83.
89 See Campbell McLachlan, Transnational Tort Litigation: An Overview, in TRANSNA-
TIONAkL TORT LITIGATION: JURISDIcrIONAL PRINCIPLES 1, 16 (Campbell McLachlan & Peter
Nygh eds., 1996); Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American
Cooperation with Those Systems, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 9, 19-25 (1996).
90 See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 79, at 180-84.
91 See William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161 (2002).
92 See id. at 183 ("[1I t is an infringement of 'sovereignty and, accordingly, public inter-
national law' for one state 'to invoke its sovereign rights within the territory' of another."
(quoting F.A. Mann, The International Enforcement of Public Rights, 19 N.Y.U. J, INT'L L. &
POL. 603, 608 (1987))).
93 See Sherman, supra note 3, at 403 ("[M]ost other countries view American class
actions as a Pandora's box that they want to avoid opening."); see also Order of the German
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 25 July 2003, 2 BVR 1198/03
(denying service of process of complaint in a U.S. class action lawsuit against global media
publisher Bertelsmann AG in Germany on the ground that the U.S. class action lawsuit,
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preclusive effect to U.S. class action judgments. The greatest point of
contention is the opt-out procedure, which, as previously discussed,
binds an absent class member to a settlement or finaljudgment unless
the individual affirmatively opts out of the action after receiving no-
tice.94 While the notice sent to potential class members must warn
them that "unless they mail in an 'opt-out' form, they will be bound by
the results of the litigation,"95 notice may be constructive rather than
actual.9 6 Therefore, "in many... class actions where there are insuffi-
cient records of purchase," a large number of class members receive
notice "through publication in newspapers, periodicals, radio, televi-
sion, or through posting in places calculated to be seen by class mem-
bers. ' 97 The idea that courts can bind a claimant to a legal judgment
based upon inaction, particularly when the claimant received notice
of the action only through constructive means, is difficult for foreign
courts to accept.98
Additionally, most other countries believe that the opt-out proce-
dure is a violation of the rights of absent class members.9 9 In some
countries, if an absent class member did not receive actual notice of
the pending action, the foreign court will not recognize the resulting
which threatened up to $17 billion in punitive damages, violated Bertelsmann's rights
under the German constitution); Bettina Friedrich, Federal Constitutional Court Grants In-
terim Legal Protection Against Service of a Writ of Punitive Damages Suit, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1233
(2003) (analyzing German Constitutional Court's decision to deny service of process in the
Bertelsmann case and suggesting that German law's suspicion of class action lawsuits and
punitive damages led to this outcome); Drew Cullen, German Court Blocks $1 7bn Bertelsmann
Suit, REG., July 28, 2003 (discussing the German Constitutional Court decision halting ser-
vice of process upon Bertelsmann on the ground that use of the class action device against
Bertelsmann was abusive), at www.theregister.co.uk/2003/07/28/german courtblocks_
17bnbertelsmann (last visited June 26, 2005); Anthony Sebok, The Napster Saga Continues,
Dec. 2003, available at http://practice.findlaw.com/napster-1203.hunl (last visitedJune 26,
2005) (same).
94 See Sherman, supra note 3, at 410.
95 Id.
96 See discussion supra Part I.B. 1.
97 Sherman, supra note 3, at 410.
98 Many U.S. legal scholars also had trouble with the idea of binding absent class
members, especially those who received only constructive notice, when Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 was first amended in 1966. See Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Obser-
vations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 45 (1967) (
To a generation raised on Pennoyer v. Neff, it is a rather heady and dis-
turbing idea to be told that people in faraway places who receive a letter or
are "described" in a newspaper "notice" which does not come to their atten-
tion are exposed to a binding judgment unless they take some affirmative
action to exclude themselves.
(citation omitted)).
99 Cf Sherman, supra note 3, at 418-32 (describing group litigation devices in other
countries, of which only Australia and Canada permit opt-out procedures, thereby sug-
gesting that the opt-out procedure does not comport with notions of due process in many
other countries).
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class judgment against that class member. 0 0 In other countries, the
opt-out procedure is so offensive that the courts will not recognize a
U.S. judgment against a class member even if the class member re-
ceived actual, in-hand notice, and therefore a valid opportunity to opt
out of the action. 10 ' Foreign practitioners from all over the globe
have submitted affidavits in U.S. courts attesting to the fact that courts
of their home countries "would not recognize a United States judg-
ment in favor of the defendant as a bar to an action by their own
citizens."1 0 2 A U.S. class action judgment in favor of plaintiffs would
suffer the same fate in foreign courts, so a foreign class member might
be able to sue again in a foreign court if the amount of the U.S. settle-
ment or final judgment did not meet the class member's fancy.'0 3
The binding nature of the class action is one of its greatest attrac-
tions. If class members could sue again whenever they were not satis-
fied with the final settlement or judgment, then a class action would
be little more than a permissive joinder device, and there would be
little reason for judges to bear the added responsibilities of certifica-
tion, notice, and general case management that a class action im-
poses. It is the promise of consistency and finality, which is possible
only because all class members are bound to the final judgment, that
tips the scales in favor of certifying a class despite these added proce-
dural burdens. Without consistency and finality, the class action loses
its force. For this reason, some judges are not willing to certify classes
100 See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 84, at 150 (suggesting that a class member must receive
"notice of the action and the chance to withdraw or object" before a British court will
recognize a U.S. judgment against him).
1O1 See, e.g., In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 48 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (suggesting that
a class member who had not actually opted in or participated in the action would not be
bound by a U.S. judgment against him in the courts of his home country).
102 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1975). In this case,
the record contained affidavits from practitioners in the United Kingdom, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and France. Id. at 996; see also In re Lloyd's Am.
Trust Fund Litig., No. 96 CIV 1262, 1998 WL 50211, at *15 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1998)
[M] any, if not all of the foreign [class members] could sue Citibank a sec-
ond time in their home jurisdictions on the very same claims, even if they
are unsuccessful here. The law surveyed includes five jurisdictions, which
are France, England, South Africa, Canada, and Switzerland, and which re-
present approximately 58 percent of the proposed class.
); Del Fierro v. PepsiCo Int'l, 897 F. Supp. 59, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (suggesting that the
Philippines would not accord preclusive effect to a U.S. class action judgment); In re U.S.
Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. at 48-49 (observing that, according to affidavits by attorneys from
France, West Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Switzerland,
and Italy, a class member who bad not affirmatively opted in or participated in the action
would not be bound by the U.S. judgment in the courts of the class member's home
country).
103 See, e.g., In re Lloyd's, 1998 WL 50211, at *15 ("[Defendant] contends, even if the
plaintiffs were to win he could relitigate in his home court in hopes of a more generous
recovery there, thereby taking 'two bites of the apple.'").
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that include foreign claimants as long as the risk remains that foreign
class members will sue again in foreign courts.
B. Problems of Sending Adequate Notice to Foreign Claimants
Certifying a class containing large numbers of foreign claimants
also raises issues of notice. As discussed above, 10 4 before a court may
bind a Rule 23(b) (3) class member to a settlement or final judgment,
the class member must receive notice of the pending action.10 5 Due
process requires that notice be reasonably calculated to give the class
member the opportunity to be heard. 10 6 This means that notice must
not only inform the class member of the pending action, including
the action's nature and scope, but must also inform the class member
of her right to make a showing in the action and of the need to affirm-
atively opt out of the action in order not to be bound by the
judgment. 10 7
The certifying judge is responsible for determining what consti-
tutes adequate notice according to the facts of the particular case.108
When all the potential class members are U.S. citizens, judges may
rely upon their own knowledge of the language and available print
media to determine what adequate notice entails. When their own
experience fails them, judges have at their disposal decades of case
law on adequate notice to inform them of what other judges have
done in the past. When many of the potential class members live
outside of the United States, determining what constitutes adequate
notice is more complicated. Linguistic and cultural barriers make it
more difficult to "communicate effectively to [foreign] claimants their
rights and options." 10 9 If the judge is not familiar with the language,
customs, literacy levels, or print-media sources of the foreign coun-
tries in which the potential class members reside, it is virtually impossi-
ble to draft an order identifying the "best notice practicable under the
circumstances."'110 If the foreign class members do not receive ade-
quate notice, they cannot be bound to the class settlement or final
judgment, because binding them without proper notice would violate
104 See supra Part I.B.1.
105 F ID. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
106 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
107 See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
108 See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
109 Bassett, supra note 74, at 64 (quoting Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 96 YAI F..J. 1,
22 (1986)). For a general discussion of the problems of sending notice to foreigners, see
id. at 64-66.
110 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2) (B); see also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974,
996 n.47 (2d Cir. 1975) (observing that the fact that notice was sent to foreign class mem-
bers only in English could be problematic).
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their due process rights."' As a result, all costs expended notifying
the foreign claimants and keeping them apprised of the action would
be wasted and the finality of the class action would be destroyed. To
avoid such a result, the judge must learn the complexities of notice in
various foreign nations, a burdensome task that wastes precious judi-
cial resources.' 12
The burden of providing adequate notice in multiple countries
and in multiple languages may also drive up the costs of providing
notice to the class. Since class counsel must absorb the costs of class
notice, this might deter plaintiffs' lawyers from taking on cases con-
taining large numbers of foreign claimants.
III
EFFICIENCY VERSUS DETERRENCE: THE OBJECTIVES OF
SMALL-Cl AIM CLASS ACTIONS
If efficiency was the only benefit arising from the use of the class
device, the increased risk that foreign claimants could sue again in
foreign courts and the increased burden of sending adequate notice
abroad would certainly weigh in favor of excluding foreign claimants
from class action lawsuits. But efficiency is not the only benefit that
the class action lawsuit offers to litigants or to society as a whole. De-
terrence of corporate wrongdoing is another major reason for permit-
ting class action lawsuits. In order to understand why federal judges
should permit foreign claimants to remain in class action lawsuits de-
spite the procedural risks that foreign claimants introduce, it is impor-
tant to explore these two objectives in greater detail.
A. Small-Claim Class Actions are Not Efficient
In certain circumstances, class action lawsuits offer both courts
and defendants some form of efficiency. By combining all claims
based upon the same set of facts into one action, a class action frees
the courts from hearing a multiplicity of suits.'1 3 It also frees defend-
ants from the expense of presenting the same evidence and experts
multiple times in successive suits.'1 4 In addition, because all class
members who have not affirmatively opted out of the lawsuit are
bound by the final judgment, the class action minimizes the risk of
inconsistent judgments' 15 -which would likely result if independent
suits were litigated in different courts-and gives defendants the com-
111 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15.
112 See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 996 n.47 ("[I]f notice is to be sent in several languages, can
the court simply delegate responsibility to insure accuracy?").
113 See 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 5.46, at 5-44.
114 See id. § 5.37, at 5-44 to 5-45.
115 See id.
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fort of knowing that they will not be forced to defend an inestimable
number of unanticipated lawsuits on the same set of facts in the fu-
ture. t" 6 But these benefits are only relevant in cases in which individ-
ual class members' claims are large enough to warrant individual
lawsuits if the class action device is not available." 17 This is commonly
found in mass tort or environmental cases, in which the nature of the
injuries and the availability of punitive damages provide an incentive
for individual victims to sue.
The efficiency objective is less applicable to small-claim securities,
antitrust, and consumer class actions. In these cases, the losses sus-
tained by individual investors and consumers are rarely large enough
to justify independent lawsuits, so rather than "avoid[ing] a multiplic-
ity of actions," the class action creates litigation.1 18 Under such cir-
cumstances, one can hardly argue that the class action lawsuit
promotes efficiency. After all, from a pure efficiency standpoint, a
class action certainly imposes greater burdens upon the court and
upon corporate defendants than no suit at all 1 19 But no suit at all is
hardly a desirable result. It is important for victims of corporate
wrongdoing to obtain compensation. It is also important that corpo-
rate wrongdoers be held accountable for their actions, which would
not be the case if victims had no cost-effective vehicle through which
to bring suit. This is the "enabling objective" of the class action mech-
anism, because it enables lawsuits that would otherwise be priced out
of the U.S. courts due to the exorbitant costs of litigation.' 2 0
B. Small-Claim Class Actions Enable Necessary Litigation
1. Giving Victims Their Day in Court
Perhaps the most basic objective of the class action device is to
ensure that individuals with small, but legitimate, legal claims receive
compensation for their injuries. It is hardly equitable or just to force
the public to bear the costs of corporate misconduct. Beyond equity
and justice, however, closing the courthouse doors to victims solely
because their injuries are not large enough to warrant independent
116 Many scholars argue that this is a major benefit of the class device, allowing corpo-
rate defendants to plan their financial resources and encouraging settlement of the class
action lawsuit. See, e.g., id. §§ 5.38 & 5.40, at 5-36 to 5-37, 5-37 to 5-39. Settlement, in turn,
saves additional court resources by eliminating the need for a complex trial.
117 See id. § 5.46, at 5-44.
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., Samuel M. Hill, Small Claimant Class Actions: Deterrence and Due Process Ex-
amined, 19 Am.J. TRIAL Alvoc. 147, 150 (1995) (observing that some commentators "ques-
tion the efficiency of certifying a class action that creates litigation where, absent the class
action device, none would exist due to the small size of the individual claims").
120 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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litigation would undermine the public's trust in the judicial system.
One judge aptly observed:
It seems to me that this matter touches on the credibility of our
judicial system. Either we are committed to make reasonable efforts
to provide a forum for the adjudication of disputes involving all our
citizens-including those deprived of human rights, consumers who
overpay for products because of antitrust violations, and investors
who are victimized by misleading information-or we are not.
There are those who will not ignore the irony of courts ready to
imprison a man who steals some goods in interstate commerce,
while unwilling to grant a civil remedy against a corporation, which
has benefited to the extent of many millions of dollars from collu-
sive, illegal pricing of goods.12 1
If individuals had no means of redress for their small claims, particu-
larly when these claims arise from the illegal conduct of large, publicly
visible corporations, many victims would lose faith in the judicial sys-
tem. The judicial system can only maintain the faith and loyalty of the
public if it provides effective methods of redress for all claims, not
only those that meet a high monetary threshold. The class action
mechanism serves this purpose, providing a cost-effective method for
litigating small claims. 122
If individuals had no means of redress for their small claims, they
would likely lose faith in the marketplace as well. Confidence in the
marketplace takes on added significance in the context of securities.
Experts in the field of securities law assert that the existence of securi-
ties class actions promotes investor confidence because investors know
that in the event of fraud they will be able to recoup some, if not all,
of their losses. 1 23 One plaintiffs' class action lawyer goes so far as to
suggest that the availability of the class action is the reason why U.S.
financial markets "are deemed more attractive and secure than for-
eign markets, where such remedies are lacking."' 2 4 As former SEC
Chairman Richard Breeden warned, "[L]imitations on private securi-
ties suits.., would erode confidence in capital markets, reduce invest-
ment, and increase the cost of capital for U.S. business." 2 5 Investor
121 Excerpts from a Symposium Before the judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, 58
F.R.D. 299, 305 (1973) (comments of Judge Jack B. Weinstein), quoted in ROSSMAN &
EDFLMAN, supra note 5, § 1.1.1, at 3.
122 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
123 See Bershad et al., supra note 3, at 6 (stating that the existence of securities class
actions "is a major reason why investors' confidence in the financial markets in the United
States has been maintained despite all the wrongdoing").
124 Id.
125 Id. at 10. Breeden also stated:
Private suits under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule
lOb-5 thereunder.., are instrumental in recompensing investors who are
cheated through the issuance of false and misleading information or by
other means .... If this were not the case, investors would be far less willing to
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confidence is an important factor in ensuring continued investment
in U.S. companies. Continued investment, in turn, is vital to keeping
the economy afloat.
2. Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct and Private Attorneys General
Deterrence of corporate misconduct is the most important objec-
tive of small-claim class action lawsuits. While government agencies-
namely the SEC, FTC, and DOJ-exist to regulate corporate behavior,
these agencies do not have the staff or resources necessary to police
all corporate misconduct. 126 In 1991, former SEC Chairman Richard
Breeden testified before Congress that "the SEC 'is able to prosecute
only a fraction of the cases in which investors have suffered losses."127
The DOJ and FTC, which prosecute violations of antitrust and con-
sumer protection laws, suffer similar inadequacies. Private civil suits
by victims of corporate misconduct, then, are a "'necessary supple-
ment' to government enforcement." 128 Without the class action
mechanism, many victims of corporate wrongdoing would never be
compensated for their losses, and corporations, knowing the short-
comings of the agencies policing them, would have little incentive to
cease their unlawful conduct.'2 9
participate in our securities markets. This would limit the most important source,
and raise costs, of new capital for all American businesses.
Id.; see also id. at 10 n.14 (
If there is a loss of public confidence in the nation's ability to provide pri-
vatc as well as public enforcement remedies as a deterrent against corpo-
rate misconduct, pension fund plan managers, along with other investors,
will be reluctant to invest in the stock of both new and mature corpora-
dons. This would, in turn, result in a diminution in the ability of these
companies to raise the capital needed for growth, expansion, or job
creation.
(quoting Lester B. Snyder & Jerry G. Gonick, The Interrelationship of Securities Class Action
Litigation and Pension Plan Tax Policy: What's Really at Stake?, 21 SEC. REG. LJ. 123, 146
(1993))).
126 Id. at 9.
127 Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Senate
Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings].
128 Bershad et al., supra note 3, at 9; see also Hearings, supra note 127, at 5 (statement of
John R. Perkins, President, North American Securities Administrators Association) ("No
one-save those who have committed the fraud in the first place-benefits from . . . [a]
wholesale assault on private rights of action."), quoted in Bershad et al., supra note 3, at 10
n.1l.
129 Admittedly, even in the absence of regulation, some corporate executives might be
deterred by moral incentives. Assuming that corporations are economically rational actors
driven by profit, however, morality rarely keeps corporations from engaging in wrongdo-
ing. One corporate executive summed up this reality rather well when he stated, "'We
think all people are honest, but they're more honest if you watch them like a hawk.'"
Mitchell Siconolfi, Bear Sterns Prospers Hiring Daring Traders That Rival Firms Shun, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 11, 1993, at Al, quoted in Bershad et al., supra note 3, at 9.
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The class action lawsuit is widely believed to be a successful deter-
rent against corporate misconduct. 3 0 If class action lawsuits did not
exist, engaging in securities fraud, price-fixing, and other abuses
would be a profitable corporate strategy. The small amounts illegally
extracted from each consumer often add up to millions of dollars.
Few victims would sue, and the costs of settling or litigating the claims
of those who do sue would most likely be less than the profit gained as
a result of the illegal practices. 13 ' The risk of a large, classwidejudg-
ment changes this calculation completely. When a corporation knows
that all injured purchasers may later sue, costing the corporation not
only compensatory damages but also litigation costs-and, in some
cases, treble or punitive damages'32-it becomes much less lucrative
to engage in such illegal conduct.133 In many cases, the threat of com-
plex litigation and a large plaintiffs' judgment is sufficient to compel
corporations to voluntarily comply with the law.' 3 4
Recognizing this deterrent effect, Congress has expressed a
strong policy in favor of encouraging enforcement of securities, anti-
trust, and consumer protection statutes through private litigation.
t3 5
130 See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (noting that consumer advocates and
government regulators both believe that class action lawsuits "provide additional incentives
for businesses to comply with regulations"); Bershad et al., supra note 3, at 17 ("The pre-
sent system does a good job of compensating victims of securities violations; it probably
does an even better, although much less visible, job of deterring such violations.").
131 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 ("When individual losses are small, any one
individual who is subject to them is unlikely to file a lawsuit against the corporation.").
132 For example, the federal antitrust laws permit claimants to recover treble damages
and allow one-way fee shifting of court costs and attorneys' fees to the losing defendant.
See Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). Many federal consumer protection laws
permit punitive damages. See ROSSMAN & EDELMAN, supra note 5, § 2.7.2.4, at 33.
133 Rossman & Edelman explain:
A company may treat small individual judgments as the cost of doing busi-
ness and continue to engage in the same illegal conduct with its other cus-
tomers. On the other hand, a company will take much more seriously the
threat of a classwide judgment-often for statutory damages and attorney
fees in excess of actual damages. Consequently, a class action may not only
modify the defendant's general business behavior, but may modify that of
other companies nationwide who engage in the same practice.
ROSSMAN & EDELMAN, supra note 5, § 1.1.1, at 4.
134 See Bershad et al., supra note 3, at 17 (
[W]e hear repeatedly from corporate counsel for many companies that
their most potent argument with their clients for dissuading conduct that
would skirt the boundaries of propriety under the securities laws is to re-
mind them of their potential personal exposure and the vigor with which
class plaintiffs pursue securities actions.
135 See I NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 5.51, at 5-48 to 5-49
Usually this policy has taken the form of inducements to facilitate private
litigation, such as express creation of a private right of action in the federal
courts without respect to the amount in controversy, authorizations for the
award of counsel fees to the successful plaintiff, treble-damage awards, liq-
uidated or statutory minimum damages, and other measures.
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In essence, Congress turned citizens into enforcers of public law, or
"private attorneys general," 136 by creating private rights of action in
the federal courts. Without the class action device, ordinary citizens
would rarely bring these public law actions since the costs of litigating
a lawsuit would far outweigh any potential return. By allowing claim-
ants to pool resources, the class action lawsuit lessens the burden on
individual claimants, making it more attractive to bring suits in the
public interest.13 7 In addition, through the prospect of large contin-
gent fee awards, the class action provides attorneys with an economic
incentive to take on these complex suits, "promot[ing] their interests
as well as those of the public at large."1 38
C. Excluding Foreign Claimants from Class Action Lawsuits
Undermines the Deterrent Function of the Class Device
1. Deterrence is a Global Problem
Excluding foreign claimants from U.S. class action lawsuits, when
these claimants cannot bring independent lawsuits or group actions
abroad, undermines the deterrent effect of the class device. The de-
terrent effect of the class action only works because corporations
know that if they engage in fraud, price-fixing, or some other con-
sumer abuse, victims will band together and sue for large damages. As
one legal scholar noted, "Corporate defendants despise class suits for
the obvious reason that their economic risk is dramatically ele-
vated."139 It is the economic risk created by private class litigation, not
public criminal enforcement statutes, that keeps corporations from
engaging in illegal behavior. If this risk is removed, then corporations
no longer have an economic incentive to comply with the law.
Excluding foreign claimants from class action lawsuits removes,
or at least lessens, the economic risk of engaging in illegal conduct
because it removes an entire category of purchasers from the litiga-
tion system. Unfortunately, "[firom the perspective of deterring ille-
gal conduct, European countries lack private procedural instruments
which can generate rigorous substantive control. 1 40 In fact, the vast
majority of countries, notjust European countries, lack such controls.
Thus, if foreign claimants cannot sue in U.S. courts, they generally
cannot sue at all. Claudio Consolo, an Italian legal scholar, gives a
telling example:
136 See supra note 11.
137 See 1 NEWBERG & CoNTE, supra note 1, § 5.51, at 5-49.
138 Id.
139 Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continential Europe? A Pre-
liminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. Irr'L & CoMp. L.J. 217, 267 (1992).
140 Id. at 267-68.
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We can take the case ... of the small investor who suffers modest
damage due to the fraud or fault of company executives. Fact and
reason teach us that in Italy this investor will not sue. The damage
being minute makes a lawsuit impossible .... The rational litigant
can do nothing but suffer the loss instead of increasing it by futile
legal action .... 141
In such a system, buyers have little power. Corporations know that
they control the consumer relationship and therefore often engage in
profit-maximizing, but abusive, conduct.
When multinational corporations know that a large portion of
the globe is easy prey to their lucrative, but illegal, selling practices,
there are two possible results: Either corporations adopt a two-tiered
system, in which U.S. customers are treated differently from foreign
customers, or corporations continue to injure both U.S. and foreign
purchasers alike, calculating that the profits gained from abroad more
than make up for the court fees and damages that must be paid out to
U.S. purchasers. Neither scenario is good for the U.S. economy or its
citizens.
In a two-tiered system, multinational corporations abide by the
law when selling to U.S. consumers, but break the law when dealing
with the rest of the world. Corporations continue to engage in illegal
conduct, but do so beyond the reach of U.S. federal laws. In Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc.,142 for example, the district court judge noted that
"[d]efendants obviously took great pains to structure their [illegal]
activities to avoid the reach of American securities laws, '" 143 going so
far as to "prevent any sales [of tainted stock] to Americans.' 44 Thus,
the corporate defendants did not cease their illegal conduct, they just
shifted it across borders, targeting legally powerless purchasers
abroad. This way the corporate defendants minimized their risk of
lawsuits while at the same time "retain [ing] the benefits that the con-
spiracy accrued abroad."' 45 The only one who benefits from such an
arrangement is the corporate defendant, who is laughing all the way
to the bank.
The traditional logic was that as long as corporations were con-
ducting themselves legally within the United States, then the U.S. fed-
eral laws had done their job.146 But this logic demonstrates little
141 Id. at 267.
142 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
143 Id. at 982 (quoting district court opinion).
144 Id. at 984 (quoting district court opinion).
145 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRouche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
vacated, 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
146 See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985 (suggesting that Congress did not intend to waste the
"precious resources of the United States courts" enforcing corporate conduct in other
countries).
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understanding for the workings of a global economy. When a corpo-
ration engages in misconduct, the resulting economic harm is not lim-
ited to the locus of the conduct. The harm spreads outward, injuring
U.S. consumers as well as the foreign consumers who were directly
victimized. In Bersch, for example, the certifying district court judge
observed that the collapse in the price of defendants' shares, which
was a direct result of defendants' illegal conduct outside of the United
States, had "adverse effects upon the American securities markets."
147
A financial markets expert opined in the case that the illegal conduct
"increased the problems of United States corporations in seeking to
raise capital abroad" and had "adverse effects on the balance of pay-
ments and the price of American securities generally."'148
Anticompetitive conduct (i.e., antitrust violations) abroad have a
similar ripple effect into the U.S. economy. One federal appellate
judge stated that "a global price-fixing scheme could sustain monop-
oly prices in the United States even in the face of domestic liability,
since the profits from abroad would subsidize the U.S. operations." 149
Thus, in order to truly protect U.S. consumers, federal judges must
deter illegal conduct abroad, not just in the United States. As the
Empagran judge warned, "Disallowing suits by foreign purchasers in-
jured by a global conspiracy because they themselves were not injured
by the conspiracy's U.S. effects runs the risk of inadequately deterring
global conspiracies that harm U.S. commerce."1 50 This Note is not
advocating that U.S. courts open their doors to victims of all corporate
wrongdoing worldwide. However, when the illegal conduct has clear
connections to the United States-such as when the misconduct is
carried out by a U.S. corporation or when the misconduct has a sub-
stantial impact upon the U.S. economy-federal judges must permit
all victims to avail themselves of the class device, regardless of their
domicile or citizenship.
The other possible scenario is that corporations, knowing that
most of the world has no adequate legal remedy, do not curb their
illegal conduct at all, either in the United States or abroad. The Su-
preme Court observed:
If foreign plaintiffs were not permitted to seek a remedy for their
... injuries, persons doing business both in this country and abroad
might be tempted to enter into ... conspiracies affecting American
consumers in the expectation that the illegal profits they could
147 Id. at 984 (quoting district court opinion).
148 Id. at 987-88 (quoting affidavit of Professor Morris Mendelson, Associate Professor
of Finance, Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania).
149 Empagran, 315 F.3d at 356 (discussing Judge Higginbotham's dissent in Den Norske
Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001), an earlier antitrust action).
150 Id.
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safely extort abroad would offset any liability to plaintiffs at
home. 151
Even if the wrongdoers have to pay out large damages to U.S. purchas-
ers, as long as courts exclude foreign claimants from class action law-
suits the corporations retain a large portion of the foreign profits. If
the misconduct stretched far enough around the globe, there is a real-
istic chance that the large sums gained from the foreign misconduct
would more than make up for the U.S. liability. U.S. courts can deter
such conduct only if all claimants, both domestic and foreign, are per-
mitted to sue as a class.
In a globalized marketplace, U.S. society suffers if foreign claim-
ants are excluded from class action lawsuits. Even if a judge believes
that the U.S. courts are intended to protect only U.S. citizens and re-
sidents, when corporate wrongdoing has an international dimension
the judge cannot protect U.S. citizens unless he certifies the entire
class, including foreign class members. Certifying classes containing
foreign members is the only way to ensure that class action lawsuits
successfully deter illegal conduct.
2. Foreign Investor Confidence is Crucial to U.S. Markets
Investor confidence is not solely a domestic problem. The U.S.
economy relies upon a steady influx of foreign investment to remain
healthy. In fact, analysts estimate that the United States needs approx-
imately $45 billion to $50 billion per month in foreign investment to
keep the economy healthy. 152 According to the Wall Street Journal,
"This money is the economic lifeblood of America. It helps the U.S.
expand and modernize factories, secure mortgages, build highways-
even fight the war in Iraq."'153
A large chunk of foreign investment comes through the purchase
of stocks and bonds on U.S. securities markets. 154 If foreign investors
lose confidence in U.S. securities markets, they will put their money
instead into foreign markets and other, perceivably more secure, in-
vestments. This withdrawal of foreign investment from U.S. financial
markets would be detrimental. One Wall Street Journal article
warned:
Were foreign investors to flee the U.S., it would depress the dollar
further and faster. Reduced foreign purchases of U.S. stocks could
151 Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978), quoted inEmpagran, 315 F.3d
at 355.
152 See Deborah Lagomarsino, Foreign Inflows Boosted U.S. Securities in November, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 19, 2004, at C3.
153 Joel Millman et al., Buying American: Foreign Cash Flow Is Vital to U.S.-But Will it
Last? WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2004, at Al.
154 Id.
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cause the market to tumble. Reducing foreign purchases of U.S.
bonds could boost the interest rates set in bond markets. If the
foreign flight were severe enough, it could push the U.S. back into
recession. 15
Thus, it is-in United States's best interest to maintain investor confi-
dence among foreign investors, not just domestic investors.
Regulation is one way to maintain investor confidence. 5 6 As pre-
viously discussed, however, the SEC is overworked and understaf-
fed. 157 As a result, the SEC is not able to proactively regulate
corporate behavior to the degree necessary to deter acts of fraud and
misrepresentation. One needs only look at the recent spate of ac-
counting fraud cases (i.e., Enron and WorldCom) to see the short-
comings of government regulation. As securities markets tumbled in
the wake of these disasters, investors-both foreign and domestic-
lost confidence in U.S. markets. 158 This is why securities class actions
are so crucial. In the wake of each corporate scandal, investors be-
come increasingly more disillusioned with their investment opportu-
nities. 15 9  They do not trust securities professionals, large
corporations, or the SEC. The one reassurance that investors have left
is the knowledge that through private rights of action and class action
lawsuits, they can sue these professionals and corporations if their in-
vestments are diminished due to misconduct. This comfort-however
small it may be-keeps investor confidence up and U.S. financial mar-
kets functioning. If foreign investors are continuously excluded from
class action lawsuits, they essentially lose their private right of action
for securities fraud, one of the major benefits of investing in U.S. fi-
nancial markets instead of investing elsewhere. It is important to real-
ize that
[floreigners with money to invest are always comparing the alterna-
tives. In a global market, they can quickly buy or sell U.S. Treasury
notes or Thai stocks or euro bonds. Markets often are seen as a
single force of nature, like the tides or the wind. But they are ...
155 Id.
156 SeeJosEPH C. LONG, 12 BLUE SKv LAW § 1:58 ("Until recently, little or no regulation
was the norm in most of the industrialized countries of the world. However, the American
markets, because of the joint federal-state regulatory system, have traditionally enjoyed the
highest degree of investor confidence of any of the world's markets for fairness and stabil-
ity."); cf Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 407, 412 (2002)
(suggesting that investor confidence is not a problem when regulatory systems work as they
should).
157 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
158 See, e.g., Millman et al., supra note 153, at Al (discussing one Japanese banker's
unease about investing in U.S. markets after "all the newspaper stories about accounting
scandals and other corporate wrongdoing").
159 See id. (telling of one Chinese businessman who no longer trusts the U.S. economy
or its currency, and therefore is "not planning to put his personal money back into the
U.S. any time soon").
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made up of many individuals placing bets-bets that matter pro-
foundly to American prosperity. 160
If the United States loses foreign investment to other markets,
U.S. prosperity will suffer. This is why federal judges must permit for-
eign investors to join securities class action lawsuits. The certifying
judge in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. understood this.' 6 ' Observing
that the corporate defendants' fraud resulted in a "decline in the
purchase of United States securities by foreigners"' 62 and "problems
of United States corporations in seeking to raise capital abroad,"
63
Judge Frankel tried to permit the foreign claimants to be class mem-
bers. 164 Unfortunately, the appellate judge was less understanding of
global markets and excluded the foreign claimants from the class.165
The district judge in In re DaimlerChiysler AG Securities Litigation was
equally unversed in global finance and also excluded foreign claim-
ants from a securities class. 166 Judge Farnan's decision to exclude for-
eign claimants in the DaimlerChrysler case was even more problematic
because a substantial portion of the alleged fraud had occurred in the
United States, as the result of a merger between a U.S. and a German
corporation.167
Especially when an act of fraud is so intimately tied to U.S. mar-
kets, federal judges must permit foreign claimants to enter class action
lawsuits when the class is the only cost-effective way for investors to
avail themselves of their right to sue. This is the only way that foreign
investors will remain confident enough in U.S. markets to continue
investing. If foreign claimants are excluded from securities classes,
everyone loses. Foreign claimants suffer because they lose their invest-
ments, U.S. corporations suffer because it becomes more difficult to
raise capital, and U.S. citizens suffer as foreign investors pull their
money out of U.S. financial markets and the economy declines as a
result. Congress understood this risk when it wrote the securities laws
and expressed a preference for private rights of action for violation of
these laws.' 68 The courts must honor this legislative preference by
permitting all claimants to join class action lawsuits.
160 Id.
161 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987-88 (2d Cir. 1975).
162 Id. at 988 (citing Mendelson affidavit).
163 Id. at 987 (citing Mendelson affidavit).
164 Id. at 982.
165 Id. at 1001.
166 See In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.RD. 291, 301 (D. Del. 2003).
167 Id. at 294.
168 See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
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IV
SAVING THE DETERRENCE OBJECTIVE: WHY THE SCALES Tip
IN FAVOR OF INCLUDING FoREiGN CLAIMANTS
IN A CLASS
As this Note has explained, while creating a legal remedy for vic-
tims with small claims is an important objective, it does not come with-
out a price. Small-claim class action lawsuits "impose[ ] additional
burdens on the judicial system and certain classes of litigants."'1 69
They expose corporate defendants to large litigation costs and dam-
ages, which are passed on to the public through increases in the prices
of the goods and services that these defendants provide.' 70 They ex-
pose the courts to large, complex lawsuits requiring a high degree of
judicial management,' 7 1 which places an additional strain on the al-
ready overtaxed district courts.
The courts are not blind to the side effects of small-claim class
action litigation. They are also not willing to completely sacrifice judi-
cial economy for the sake of creating legal remedies. This is the fun-
damental problem that judges face when asked to certify classes
consisting of foreign claimants: Judges cannot fully deter corporate
misconduct if they exclude foreign claimants from the class, but they
cannot ensure efficiency-in the sense of judicial economy and final-
ity from future, related litigation-if they include foreign claimants in
the class. In the majority of cases, however, this tension is more theo-
retical than actual. The fact that a foreign court will not automatically
afford preclusive effect to a U.S. class action judgment does not mean
that foreign claimants will, in fact, sue again in foreign courts, as other
barriers often exist that make relitigating the case in a foreign court
impracticable. 172 These same barriers often mean that foreign claim-
ants have no alternate remedy-either in the United States or
abroad-if a federal judge excludes them from a class.' 7 3 Thus, in the
majority of cases, deterrence is a real problem, but efficiency and pro-
cedural fairness are not.
In order to determine when it is desirable to include foreign
claimants in a class, certifying judges must go beyond facial assump-
tions about "efficiency" and "manageability" of the class and pay
greater attention to the circumstances of each particular case. Certify-
ing judges must examine on a case-by-case basis whether foreign
169 FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 39, § 16.1, at 722.
170 See Hill, supra note 119, at 154 ("[T]he great expense of the litigation will often be
reflected in higher prices to consumers, negating any beneficial effect of enforcing the
law.").
171 See Miller, supra note 2, at 667.
172 See infta Part [V.A.
173 See infta Part IV.B.
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claimants have a realistic means to sue again in foreign courts if the
settlement or verdict is not in their favor. They must also examine
whether foreign claimants have an alternative remedy if excluded
from the class. The current inquiry lacks the depth that is necessary
to really understand the problem. When the U.S. class device is the
foreign claimants' only cost-effective method of bringing suit, a certi-
fying judge must not exclude foreign claimants from the class. Doing
so would substantially undermine the deterrent objective of the class
device without reason, since the lack of adequate alternative litigation
options minimizes the risk of subsequent litigation, and therefore ob-
viates the efficiency and finality concerns that weigh in favor of ex-
cluding foreign claimants in the first place.
A. The Difficulties of Suing Again in Foreign Courts
When considering the res judicata concerns introduced by for-
eign class members, few federal judges are factoring in the actual like-
lihood of repeat litigation. Instead, they are taking the mere fact that
a foreign court would not recognize a U.S. class judgment as conclu-
sive evidence that the class mechanism is no longer "superior," as re-
quired by Rule 23.174 They are leaving out the equally important
consideration of whether absent foreign class members actually would
(or could) sue again in foreign courts, from a practical perspective,
thereby triggering the res judicata problem in the first place.
Currently, judges ask whether foreign claimants could sue again in
foreign courts if the settlement or verdict is not in their favor. Judges
decide whether or not foreign claimants could sue again in foreign
courts based on affidavits from foreign lawyers about the state of the
law in their home countries. 75 This is not sufficient. The attorney
affidavits that certifying judges rely on to deny foreign claimants ac-
cess to classes are usually offered to the court by defendants, as a
means of contesting the motion for class certification.' 7 6 While these
affidavits may be technically accurate, they tell only half the story.
These affidavits do not tell of the procedural and legal barriers to suit
that exist in the plaintiffs' home countries that make it highly improb-
able that absent foreign class members would sue again in foreign
courts. If certifying judges would look at the whole picture, they
would often realize that the actual risk that foreign class members will
sue again, on the same facts, in foreign courts is much less likely than
lawyers' affidavits and theoretical discussions suggest. The Supreme
174 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
175 See, e.g., In re Lloyd's Am. Trust Fund Litig., No. 96 CIV 1292, 1998 WL 50211, at
*15 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1998) (relying upon affidavits opining as to the effect of U.S. class
judgments abroad); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 48 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (same).
176 See, e.g., In re Lloyd's, 1998 WL 50211, at *15 n.7.
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Court once warned that "great caution should be used not to let fic-
tion deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhe-
sion to fact."' 77 Federal judges must heed this warning when
considering class certification motions.
The risk that absent foreign class members will sue again in the
courts of their home countries is often more theoretical than actual.
A number of barriers, including lack of contingent fees, smaller dam-
age awards, and the concentration of the evidence outside of the
claimants' home countries, make suing again on the same set of facts
outside of the United States unrealistic. 17  Granted, given the skepti-
cism with which many other countries approach U.S. class judgments,
it is often true that the foreign claimants could sue again, as the U.S.
judgment would not have preclusive effect. The practical difficulties
involved in litigating abroad, however, usually make this theoretical
possibility impracticable.' 79 If judges were to weigh these factors
more carefully when considering certification of a class, in most cases
they would discover that the risk of repeat litigation in foreign courts
is minor and does not justify exclusion of foreign claimants. This is
exactly the conclusion the judge reached in In re U.S. Financial Securi-
ties Litigation.18 0
B. The Scarcity of Adequate Remedies Outside of the Class
Device
Few other countries have class action devices.' 81 Many foreign
countries now recognize the value of group and representative litiga-
tion devices in cases in which "the claims of many individuals arise
from the same basic conduct of a defendant,"'182 but the growth of
group and representative litigation in other countries is still slow. 1 8 3
177 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
178 See, e.g., Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 139, at 267 (discussing various reasons why
an Italian investor who suffers small losses at the hands of corporate executives would not
sue, including uncertain legal standards, attorneys' fees disproportionate to the size of the
claim, and the difficulties involved in collecting proof).
179 See, e.g., In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. at 48-49 (recognizing that even though
class members would likely not be bound in their home countries by a U.S. class judgment
against them, "practical difficulties," such as the location of evidence in the United States,
make lawsuits in the foreign claimants' home countries "virtually impossible").
180 Id.
181 See Sherman, supra note 3, at 424-32 (describing the Australian federal class device
and the Canadian class device, the two foreign group-litigation mechanisms that most
closely resemble the U.S. class action).
182 Id. at 401.
183 This is most likely because group and representative litigation is not well-suited to
other legal cultures. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee
Paradigms From Class Actions, DucE J. COMP. & INT'L L., Summer 2003, at 125, 125-26 (dis-
cussing how attorney fee-shifting practices in other countries deter group litigation); Sher-
man, supra note 3, at 402 (observing that even in countries that maintain group litigation
devices, group litigation is not as popular as in the United States, and attributing this dif-
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Of those countries that do maintain group litigation mechanisms, few
are structured in a manner similar to the U.S. class action.' 8 4 For ex-
ample, in some countries a state-sanctioned consumer association
must initiate the group action, so the availability of this form of litiga-
tion is extremely limited.185 In addition, some countries limit group
litigants to injunctive relief only.18 6 Without monetary damages, the
individual claimant does not receive compensation, either for her in-
juries or for the hassle of bringing the lawsuit. This does not comport
with U.S. notions of an "adequate" remedy. Thus, group and repre-
sentative litigation is rarely available to foreign claimants. Without a
group litigation device, victims with small claims will rarely be able to
bring lawsuits in their home countries.
When the financial losses suffered by foreign investors or con-
sumers are small, independent lawsuits in the courts of the claimants'
home countries are rarely feasible. It is true that most other countries
require the losing party to pay the reasonable court costs and attor-
neys' fees of the losing party,1 8 7 so the actual costs of litigation may no
longer outweigh the potential return. It is also true, however, that
most other countries do not allow contingent fee arrangements, so a
claimant can bring a lawsuit only if she has enough money to pay the
attorney upfront and wait for reimbursement after the lawsuit is set-
fled and she has prevailed. Even if the claimant has the disposable
cash-or litigation insurance-to pay the attorney and hope for a
favorable outcome years later, the small amounts at stake hardlyjustify
such an investment. This rules out any hope of litigation for a large
number of foreign claimants.
In addition, other countries do not permit punitive or treble
damages.1 18 Therefore, at the end of the litigation, the individual liti-
gant can recover only actual damages, which, in the case of a securi-
ties, antitrust, or consumer action, can be quite small. Even if the
litigant will get court and attorneys' fees back at the end of the lawsuit,
the nonmonetary costs of filing and maintaining a lawsuit-such as
hours spent in court or interacting with attorneys and the stress of an
ference to "such legal differences as the absence of juries, a career judiciary, less activist
and entrepreneurial attorneys, and the 'loser-pays' rule for shifting attorneys' fees").
184 See Sherman, supra note 3, at 418-32 (discussing group litigation in Germany, Swe-
den, United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada).
185 See id. at 419-20 (describing German and Swedish group-litigation practices, and
referring to similar practices in France and Greece).
186 See id. at 419 (noting that German consumer associations may sue for injunctive
relief, but not monetary damages).
187 Most civil-law countries require that the losing party pay the reasonable court costs
and attorneys' fees of the prevailing party. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of
Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651, 651 (referring to the loser-pays
practice in the United Kingdom and the civil-law countries of Continental Europe).
188 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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adversarial process-far outweigh the miniscule returns that the indi-
vidual claimant would walk away with at the end of the action.
When a judge considers whether to certify a class consisting of
foreign claimants, the judge must consider each of these factors. The
judge must look at whether group or representative litigation devices
exist in the countries where the foreign class members reside, and, if
so, must decide whether such devices are readily available to the
claimants. If no group litigation is possible, the judge must look at
whether bans on contingent fees and punitive or treble damages make
independent litigation undesirable.
In addition to these factors, the certifying judge must also con-
sider where the bulk of the evidence necessary to prove the case is
located. If the defendant is a U.S. corporation, it is highly likely that
documents and other evidence will be located in the United States. If
the defendant is a foreign corporation but a substantial part of the
alleged wrongdoing was perpetrated in the United States, it is also
likely that witnesses and documents will be located in the United
States. As the judge in In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation8 9 recog-
nized, when the bulk of the evidence is located in the United States,
the practical difficulties of shipping and translating documents and
getting witnesses to testify abroad often rule out an otherwise feasible
suit in a foreign court.' 90
While collecting and evaluating this additional information may
seem like an added burden to the certifying judge, it does not need to
be. As mentioned above, it is class counsels' responsibility to prove as
part of the motion for certification that the class meets all the require-
ments of Rule 23.191 This includes the requirement of "superior-
ity."1 9 2 Since all of the facts discussed above speak to the "superiority"
of class action, plaintiffs bear the burden of pleading these facts as
well. Thus, this added information would be included by class counsel
as part of the motion to certify the class. Once pled, however, it is the
certifying judge's obligation to weigh these factors carefully to deter-
mine if an alternate method of suit actually exists.
Theoretical inefficiencies should not tip the scales in favor of ex-
cluding foreign claimants since other, equally legitimate, goals of the
class action will be lost as a result. Excluding foreign claimants from
class actions to avoid theoretical risks serves neither plaintiffs nor the
judicial system as a whole. Given that foreign claimants rarely have an
adequate remedy outside of the class device or a realistic and practical
way to relitigate the same case in a foreign court, federal courts should
189 69 F.R.D. 24 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
190 See id. at 48-49.
191 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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adopt a presumption in favor of including foreign claimants in small-
claim class action lawsuits. Defendants could then rebut this pre-
sumption by presenting concrete evidence that the foreign claimants
do, in fact, have adequate alternative remedies or could, from a practi-
cal standpoint, sue again in the courts of their home countries. This
default presumption in favor of including foreign claimants would en-
sure that the deterrence and investor-confidence benefits of the class
action are not destroyed based upon theoretical, but unrealistic,
possibilities.
CONCLUSION
Federal judges must understand that U.S. society, not just the for-
eign claimants themselves, may suffer if foreign claimants are consist-
ently excluded from class actions as a result of efficiency concerns.
Efficiency is not the only reason why the class action mechanism de-
veloped. Deterrence of corporate wrongdoing and the promotion of
investor confidence are equally desirable goals. Without including
foreign claimants in class actions, these goals are impossible to
achieve. There are times when these enabling functions of the class
action device far outweigh any potential decrease in efficiency created
by foreign claimants. This is especially true in cases in which foreign
claimants do not have an adequate remedy abroad, and the amounts
lost by individual consumers or investors are so small that indepen-
dent suits in U.S. courts are unrealistic. 193 In such cases, a U.S. class
action lawsuit is not only the claimants' only method of recourse, it is
society's only opportunity to litigate the suit in order to punish the
wrongdoers and deter such conduct in the future.
Judges must understand that granting foreign victims of corpo-
rate wrongdoing access to U.S. courts has implications far beyond
compensating the individual victims. Permitting foreign claimants ac-
cess to U.S. class action lawsuits also, in a less direct way, protects U.S.
citizens' 94 by deterring corporate wrongdoing and by promoting con-
193 This includes most securities, antitrust, and consumer actions, See, e.g., In re
DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 300 (D. Del. 2003) (acknowledging that in
securities actions the damages of individual plaintiffs are often "too small to justify a suit
against a large corporate defendant" (quoting Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D.
359, 378 (D. Del. 1990))); HENSLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 17 (noting that in the context of
consumer class actions, "the consumer is [often] shut out of the courthouse by economic
realities" (quoting Consumer Class Action: Hearings Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1971) (statement of Sen. Frank E. Moss, Chair,
Senate Committee on Commerce))).
194 See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 ("In the long run ... consumers are well-
served by lawsuits that succeed in eliminating inappropriate business practices that would
otherwise impose unwarranted costs on individuals.").
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fidence in U.S. financial markets among foreign investors. 195 These
are worthwhile goals.
When faced with motions to certify classes consisting of foreign
members, federal judges must approach the certification process care-
fully. It is true that the binding nature of the class action lawsuit is the
class action's most distinctive feature, so the concern that foreign
claimants will undermine the efficiency of the class because they will
not be bound by the final judgment is legitimate. One could certainly
argue that without the binding force of the class action lawsuit, other
forms of suit become superior. But federal judges must understand
that the efficiency of the class often is not threatened to the extent
that the defendants' affidavits suggest. The theoretical ability to sue
does not always translate into an actual remedy. 196 Federal judges
must also understand that any minor decrease in efficiency brought
on by the inclusion of foreign claimants is usually far outweighed by
the enabling benefits of the class device. When corporate wrongdoing
has an international dimension, the federal judicial system cannot de-
ter corporate wrongdoing or ensure healthy financial markets unless
foreign claimants are included in class actions along with their domes-
tic counterparts.
Given the difficulties of bringing small-claim lawsuits in the
courts of most foreign countries, the presumption must be in favor of
permitting the foreign claimants to join the class. Only if the defen-
dant can prove that alternative remedies are realistically available to
the foreign claimants-either in the United States or abroad-should
the judge refuse to include the foreign claimants. In the majority of
cases, however, other methods of suit are not available to the claim-
ants, making the class action lawsuit "superior." In these cases, the
judge must certify the entire class, including the foreign claimants.
After all, "one of the rationales for Rule 23," which judges must re-
member when deliberating over certification, "is to prevent the 'death
knell' of a nonfrivolous action simply because it is too expensive for
small investors to prosecute individually." 197 This rationale applies to
foreign, notjust domestic, claimants. To protect this goal, when other
forms of suit are impracticable the certifying judge must permit for-
eign claimants to join the class.
195 See discussion supra Part III.C.
196 See supra Part [V.A.
197 In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 46 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
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